| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, the api/cluster router exposes node and namespace mutation operations and cluster-wide Nginx reload or restart operations with AuthRequired but without RequireSecureSession. An authenticated OTP-enabled user possessing a stolen or persisted JWT can therefore perform node CRUD, read or replace node credentials, change namespaces, and invoke nodes/reload_nginx or nodes/restart_nginx without a fresh second-factor step-up. This issue is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-84315 and is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, POST /api/login checks EnabledOTP but does not require a WebAuthn assertion when EnabledPasskey is true and no TOTP secret is configured. A passkey-only account is therefore issued a session after password verification, despite Enabled2FA reporting that the account has a second factor. An attacker who obtains the password can take over the account and reach administrative functionality without the registered passkey. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, Nginx UI accepts the Node.Secret master credential through the node_secret query parameter in HTTP and WebSocket authentication paths instead of requiring the X-Node-Secret header. The credential can consequently appear in access logs, proxy logs, browser history, Referer headers, configuration URLs, and deployment environment data. A party that obtains the secret can bypass normal password, JWT, session, and second-factor checks and obtain persistent administrative API access, including access to configuration and secret material. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, ordinary authenticated users can access /api/nodes and /api/nodes/:id, whose responses serialize the node token field. The same token is accepted as X-Node-Secret by AuthRequired and maps the request to initUser, allowing the user to impersonate a trusted node against a reachable cluster member. This cross-node authentication bypass can expose sensitive management operations, including configuration synchronization and service restart. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, the self-upgrade mechanism validates a downloaded binary only with a same-origin digest obtained from the same upgrade mirror. A compromised mirror or network attacker able to alter both responses can supply a malicious executable and matching digest. An operator-triggered upgrade is required, and the application installs and runs the attacker-controlled code in the Nginx UI process context on the next upgrade. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, AuthRequired accepts a browser-managed token cookie as an API credential after the front end stores the JWT in that cookie. Because management endpoints do not universally require a CSRF token or perform Origin or Referer validation, a remote attacker can induce a logged-in administrator's browser to submit authenticated cross-site state-changing requests, including POST /api/configs. The attack requires an administrator account without OTP/Passkey or a target endpoint that does not require secure-session proof. The attacker cannot read the cross-origin response but can modify Nginx configuration, trigger reloads, or invoke other management operations reachable with the victim's session. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.2.0 until 2.6.0, the bundled reverse proxy does not preserve the external client identity used by Gin because the backend has no trusted proxy configuration. Management requests can be attributed to loopback and pass the IP allowlist loopback exception, although valid credentials are still required. Failed logins from different external clients are also attributed to the same loopback address, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to trigger a shared temporary login ban for password or OTP authentication without invalidating existing sessions. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.3.8 until 2.5.0, an authenticated administrator with an active secure session can submit attacker-controlled portable backup key material and a matching manifest to POST /api/restore. The restore flow trusts the supplied key, decrypts attacker-controlled contents, and replaces the live app.ini, including protected nginx command settings such as TestConfigCmd. Triggering POST /api/nginx/test then executes the restored command in the Nginx UI runtime context, affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.5.0 until 2.6.0, the node-signature authentication path performs temporary file staging of an attacker-controlled request body and synchronizes it before validating the body digest and cryptographic signature. An unauthenticated remote client that can reach the API and provide syntactically valid signature metadata can consume temporary filesystem capacity, disk input and output, and request-processing resources before rejection. The issue affects availability and does not bypass authentication or provide confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, internal/backup/restore.go extracts inner archives before applying the restore_nginx and restore_nginx_ui flags and permits symlinks targeting the live Nginx configuration path. An authenticated user who can create and restore backups can craft a valid backup that places a symlink in the staging tree and then writes a regular file through that link, even when both restore flags are false. This can persistently inject configuration or cause denial of service when the modified files are later consumed. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. In 2.3.4 and earlier, an authenticated user can perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) by creating a cluster node pointing to an arbitrary internal URL and then sending API requests with the X-Node-ID header. The Proxy middleware forwards these requests to the attacker-specified internal address, bypassing network segmentation and enabling access to services bound to localhost or internal networks. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. In version 2.3.5, an unauthenticated bootstrap takeover exists in nginx-ui during the initial installation window exposed by POST /api/install. At time of publication no public patches are available. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From version 2.0.0 to before version 2.3.8, an unauthenticated network attacker can claim the initial administrator account on a fresh nginx-ui instance during the first-run setup window. The public /api/install endpoint is reachable without authentication, and the request-encryption flow only protects payload confidentiality in transit; it does not authenticate who is allowed to perform installation. A remote attacker who reaches the service before the legitimate operator can set the admin email, username, and password, causing permanent initial-instance takeover. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, an authenticated user can call GET /api/settings and retrieve sensitive configuration values, including node.secret. The same node.secret is accepted by AuthRequired() through the X-Node-Secret header (or node_secret query parameter), causing the request to be treated as authenticated via the trusted-node path and associated with the init user. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, the GetSettings API handler (api/settings/settings.go:24-65) serializes all settings structs to JSON and returns them to authenticated users. Many sensitive fields are tagged with protected:"true" - however, this tag is only enforced during writes (via ProtectedFill in SaveSettings) and is completely ignored during reads. This exposes 40+ protected fields including JwtSecret (enabling auth token forgery), NodeSecret (enabling cluster node impersonation), OIDC ClientSecret (enabling OAuth account takeover), and the IP whitelist configuration. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.5, all WebSocket endpoints in nginx-ui use a gorilla/websocket Upgrader with CheckOrigin unconditionally returning true, allowing Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). Combined with the fact that authentication tokens are stored in browser cookies (set via JavaScript without HttpOnly or explicit SameSite attributes), a malicious webpage can establish authenticated WebSocket connections to the nginx-ui instance when a logged-in administrator visits the attacker-controlled page. Version 2.3.5 patches the issue. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.4, a user who was disabled by an administrator can use previously issued API tokens for up to the token lifetime. In practice, disabling a compromised account does not actually terminate that user’s access, so an attacker who already stole a JWT can continue reading and modifying protected resources after the account is marked disabled. Since tokens can be used to create new accounts, it is possible the disabled user to maintain the privilege. Version 2.3.4 patches the issue. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.3, the /api/backup endpoint is accessible without authentication and discloses the encryption keys required to decrypt the backup in the X-Backup-Security response header. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to download a full system backup containing sensitive data (user credentials, session tokens, SSL private keys, Nginx configurations) and decrypt it immediately. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.3. |
| Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. In versions 2.3.5 and prior, the nginx-ui MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration exposes two HTTP endpoints: /mcp and /mcp_message. While /mcp requires both IP whitelisting and authentication (AuthRequired() middleware), the /mcp_message endpoint only applies IP whitelisting - and the default IP whitelist is empty, which the middleware treats as "allow all". This means any network attacker can invoke all MCP tools without authentication, including restarting nginx, creating/modifying/deleting nginx configuration files, and triggering automatic config reloads - achieving complete nginx service takeover. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches. |
