| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager, versions prior to 5.34.00.16, contains an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Code execution and Filesystem access for attacker. |
| Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in add-ons.org PDF for Contact Form 7 pdf-for-contact-form-7 allows Path Traversal.This issue affects PDF for Contact Form 7: from n/a through 7.1.0. |
| Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in ZealousWeb Generate PDF using Contact Form 7 generate-pdf-using-contact-form-7 allows Path Traversal.This issue affects Generate PDF using Contact Form 7: from n/a through 4.2.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: require the MAC header to be present in __vlan_insert_inner_tag()
__vlan_insert_inner_tag() only guarantees head room via skb_cow_head(),
never that mac_len bytes of MAC header are present. Its ETH_HLEN
wrappers - __vlan_insert_tag() under skb_vlan_push(), and
vlan_insert_tag() under validate_xmit_vlan() on the generic transmit
path - therefore rewrite the first 16 bytes at skb->data: a 12-byte
memmove plus two 2-byte stores at +12 and +14. No caller supplies the
bound, while the pop helpers use skb_ensure_writable()/pskb_may_pull().
An IFF_TUN device has hard_header_len == 0, so packet_snd() accepts a
one-byte AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW frame. The first vlan push only sets a
hwaccel tag; the next - clsact "action vlan push" or
bpf_skb_vlan_push() - enters the helper with skb->len still 1. The
head comes from skbuff_small_head without __GFP_ZERO, so each push
drags bytes from beyond skb->tail into the frame. After three the
one-byte send leaves as 13 bytes carrying 11 bytes of uninitialised
slab:
0000: 5a b3 62 12 80 88 ff ff 00 b3 62 12 81
`------------------------------'
only 0x5a was sent; the rest is slab, here the top 56 bits of a
linear-map address
Require the MAC header the helper rewrites to be present, so such a
frame is dropped rather than transmitted. |
| A path traversal vulnerability was found in gvproxy, the network forwarder provided by the gvisor-tap-vsock package. The unauthenticated /services/forwarder/expose endpoint does not validate the caller-supplied socket path, allowing an attacker to delete arbitrary files on the host system. |
| A path traversal vulnerability exists in the web management interface of multiple Multifunction Devices and Printers, including Apeos C4571 1.1.3 and earlier, Apeos C3567 1.1.3, or other products listed, specifically in the handling of externally supplied parameters.
If the device receives a specially crafted, malicious request, it may trigger unintended processing. |
| lrzsz before 0.13.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the lrz receive utility's restricted mode that allows malicious ZMODEM senders to write files outside the current directory using absolute pathnames. Because checkpath() in src/lrz.c only rejects '../' sequences unless built with --enable-pubdir, attackers can send files named with absolute paths to overwrite any file writable by the receiving user. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. From 1.25.1 until 1.35.0, Kiota copies x-ai-capabilities.response_semantics.oauth_card_path from an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description into a generated API plugin manifest without validating that the value is a safe package-relative file reference. Parent-directory traversal, rooted paths, or absolute URIs can therefore reach a consuming host that resolves the reference, allowing the host to cross the intended plugin-package boundary or use an unintended authentication card. Kiota does not itself read a local file or execute code merely while generating the manifest, and impact requires downstream resolution of the unsafe reference. This issue is fixed in version 1.35.0. |
| Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/icongenie 6.1.1, the icongenie generate --profile command accepted folder and name values from a user-supplied profile without constraining the resolved destination to the Quasar project directory. icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js joined those values with appDir, while icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js required only non-empty strings, allowing parent-directory traversal. A developer who runs a crafted profile can cause generated image content to be written or overwritten at any path writable by that user, potentially modifying shell startup files, build scripts, or other executable configuration. This issue is fixed in version 6.1.1. |
| Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. From 1.0.0 until 3.3.0, @quasar/app-vite recursively removed the resolved build.distDir before building without rejecting the project root, user home directory, filesystem roots, or symlink-resolved external directories. An unsafe trusted configuration can delete data writable by the build user before compilation begins. No attacker-controlled input reaches build.distDir by default, so exploitation requires compromised or less-trusted automation to influence build configuration, or a developer to run a mistaken configuration. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0. |
| On affected versions of CloudVision Portal (on-premises) or CloudVision Sensor, a path traversal vulnerability exists. An authenticated user with sufficient high privileges could exploit this to extract unintended data from the Sensor. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 0.3.10 in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend-module-bitbucket-cloud and 0.2.25 in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend-module-bitbucket-server, the Bitbucket pull-request Scaffolder actions did not sufficiently validate filesystem paths. An authenticated user who can execute an eligible template and influence an allowed Bitbucket repository could affect paths outside the expected working area, potentially compromising backend confidentiality, integrity, or availability. This issue is fixed in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend-module-bitbucket-cloud 0.3.10 and @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend-module-bitbucket-server 0.2.25. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 2.2.4, the @backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend package is affected by improper authorization enforcement for techdocs static content. An authenticated user with access to one TechDocs documentation site could craft a URL able to read documentation belonging to a different entity. This only affects deployments using the external TechDocs builder with an external storage provider (S3, GCS, etc.) and the permission framework enabled. Instances that do not use the permission framework are unaffected, since TechDocs content is visible to all authenticated users by design. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.4. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 2.2.4, the @backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend package is affected by improper input validation in techdocs static content requests. When using the Azure Blob Storage provider, an authenticated Backstage user may be able to read restricted TechDocs content when entity-level permissions are enabled. Deployments that intentionally disable the default backend authentication policy may have broader exposure. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.4. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 0.6.17, the @backstage/plugin-proxy-backend package is affected by improper input validation in proxy-backend. An authenticated Backstage user could craft a request URL that causes the proxy-backend to forward the request to a path outside the configured base path on the target server. This is limited to target servers already configured as proxy endpoints and requires Backstage authentication by default. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.17. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 1.54.6, cloud storage catalog providers did not sufficiently validate object paths. A principal able to create or rename objects in a configured Azure Blob Storage or AWS S3 catalog source could cause catalog descriptors to be read from outside the intended storage boundary, limited to locations reachable with the backend's configured credentials. This issue is fixed in 1.54.6. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 0.17.8, the @backstage/backend-defaults package is affected by improper input validation in cloud storage url readers. An attacker with write access to a cloud storage bucket used by Backstage could craft object names that could collide with protected files in the output directory. In certain deployment configurations, this could lead to content injection. This issue is fixed in version 0.17.8. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 3.9.1, the @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend package is affected by inconsistent enforcement of allowed location types during catalog processing. Under certain configurations, the catalog backend could process location types that were not intended to be allowed, potentially leading to unintended file access on the backend host. This issue is fixed in version 3.9.1. |
| Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 1.15.4, the @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node package is affected by potential file exposure through local techdocs publisher. When using the local TechDocs publisher (techdocs.publisher.type: 'local'), it was possible for the documentation serving endpoint to follow filesystem references outside the intended documentation tree, potentially exposing host files to authenticated users. This is mitigated by the fact that exploration requires preconditions that do not arise through normal MkDocs operation. Cloud-based publishers (S3, GCS, Azure Blob Storage) are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.15.4. |
| Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue. |