| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A certificate with no dNSName SAN but another SAN type present (e.g. registeredID or iPAddress) bypassed the Subject CN dNSName name-constraint check. The CN-as-DNS fallback was gated on cert->subjectCN != NULL && cert->altNames == NULL && !cert->isCA instead of "no dNSName SAN", so an out-of-scope CN was accepted. This incomplete fix from CVE-2026-6731, leading to the name-constraint check issue, was introduced in wolfSSL version 5.9.2. |
| A failed X509_verify_cert call permanently plants an unverified attacker CA in the shared CertManager, bypassing certificate validation in every type-blind sibling consumer (native TLS, OCSP, CRL, direct CM verify). This affects version 5.8.4 through 5.9.2 of wolfSSL with the macros (OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_CERTS && !WOLFCRYPT_ONLY) defined or built with --enable-opensslextra and the application is specifically making calls to the X509_verify_cert function. |
| MatchTrustedPeer ignores the public key used, leading to forged CA clones passing verification. Affected builds are any that enable the macro WOLFSSL_TRUST_PEER_CERT and load CA certificates with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert(). The peer must know the certificates being loaded to either of those APIs to take advantage of the issue. When OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS is also defined this widens the affected API to include all CA certificate loading. Both macros are defined when using autoconf builds such as (nginx, haproxy, stunnel, wpas, apache httpd, hitch, bind, rsyslog, ffmpeg, all, distro). When the certificate is listed as a trusted peer certificate the issue previously allowed for a malicious (D)TLS server to bypass authentication once knowing which CA’s the client would accept. This also affects mutual authentication cases where the client knows which CA’s the server has loaded. If building with any of these configurations and using (D)TLS where the loaded CA’s could be known and authentication of the peer is desired, users should either: update to the latest wolfSSL version, apply the fix patch, or use the configure flag --disable-openssl-compatible-defaults and not load CA’s with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert() to mitigate the issue. |
| Improper certificate validation, Return of wrong status code vulnerability in Apache Thrift python bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Netty versions from 4.2.11.Final before 4.2.18.Final contain an incomplete hostname verification fix in the QUIC certificate verification path when using a plain X509TrustManager. The BoringSSLCertificateVerifyCallback discards the SSLEngine for plain trust managers, preventing endpoint identification from running even when HTTPS verification is configured. Attackers on the network path can present a certificate chain for the wrong hostname that the plain trust manager accepts, bypassing hostname authentication for QUIC clients. |
| The Joyland AI app accepts any TLS certificates from any server without validation. |
| The Joyland AI app accepts invalid SSL certificates in the invisible advertisement WebView by default. |
| Improper certificate validation vulnerability in HAVELSAN Inc. Sef - AI Chatbot Platform allows Adversary in the Middle (AiTM).
This issue affects Sef - AI Chatbot Platform: before 2.1. NOTE: The vendor was contacted and it was learned that the product is not supported. |
| A flaw was found in gnutls. When validating certificates, an oversized Subject Alternative Name (SAN) could cause the validation process to incorrectly fall back to checking the Common Name (CN) field. This could allow a remote attacker to bypass proper certificate validation, potentially leading to spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks. |
| A flaw was found in gnutls. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by presenting a specially crafted certificate that contains Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) or Service (SRV) Subject Alternative Names (SANs). This could cause the certificate validation process to incorrectly fall back to checking DNS hostnames against the Common Name (CN), potentially allowing the attacker to spoof legitimate services or intercept sensitive information. |
| A flaw was found in gnutls. This vulnerability occurs because permitted name constraints were incorrectly ignored when previous Certificate Authorities (CAs) only had excluded name constraints. A remote attacker could exploit this to bypass critical name constraint checks during certificate validation. This bypass could lead to the acceptance of invalid certificates, potentially enabling spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks against affected systems. |
| GraphQL Tools provides utilities for building, stitching, and mocking GraphQL schemas. Prior to 1.1.35, the executor-legacy-ws buildWSLegacyExecutor() function hardcodes TLS certificate rejection off for Node.js connections to wss:// endpoints. Applications using the executor directly, or url-loader with SubscriptionProtocol.LEGACY_WS, can therefore accept an attacker-controlled certificate when a network-positioned attacker intercepts the connection. Authentication material in connectionParams or headers can be disclosed, and subscription data can be modified. Browser WebSocket clients are unaffected because browsers enforce certificate validation. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.35. |
| The Apache Traffic Server certifier plugin generates certificates based on attacker-controlled client SNI.
This issue affects Apache Traffic Server: from 8.0.0 through 8.1.11, from 9.0.0 through 9.2.14, from 10.0.0 through 10.1.3.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.2.15 or 10.1.4, which fix the issue. |
| @grpc/grpc-js implements the core functionality of gRPC purely in JavaScript, without a C++ addon. Prior to 1.13.6 and 1.14.5, getAuthContext does not distinguish authorized from unauthorized peer certificates when server credentials set requireClientCertificate to false. When applications use the returned authentication context, they can treat an unauthorized certificate as authorized, causing improper authentication. @grpc/grpc-js-xds can reach this condition when RBAC authentication is enabled in affected configurations. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.5 and 1.13.6. |
| ssl.SSLContext.wrap_bio() didn't require the server_hostname argument
to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.check_hostname was set. Due to a
missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the server_hostname argument
isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.
This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification
*appeared* to be succeeding with SSLContext.check_hostname = True and no
ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.
If the program passes a server_hostname value that isn't an empty string
or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification
proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.
Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying
the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty
server_hostname value to SSLContext.wrap_bio(),
asyncio.create_connection(), or asyncio.loop.start_tls() and
certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to
the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the
behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a
ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrap_socket(), when server_hostname
isn't supplied. |
| urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 1.26.0 until 2.8.0, the proxy_ssl_context, proxy_assert_hostname, proxy_assert_fingerprint, ssl_context, cert_reqs, verify_mode, use_forwarding_for_https=True, and CERT_NONE configuration paths fail to remain separated because target-server TLS settings are incorrectly applied to the HTTPS proxy connection. The trigger is that an application uses an HTTPS proxy and configures target-server TLS settings that must remain separate from the proxy TLS handshake, including HTTPS forwarding with target-specific identity or credentials. Applying cert_reqs=CERT_NONE can overwrite proxy_ssl_context.verify_mode in place, and the mutation persists so later connections reusing the same context may connect to the HTTPS proxy without certificate verification. The attack mechanism is that an attacker intercepts and impersonates the HTTPS proxy after the effective proxy policy accepts the attacker's certificate. The impact is that the attacker can observe or modify forwarded traffic or receive a target TLS client certificate, while CONNECT tunneling still preserves the separate end-to-end target TLS connection. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.0. |
| An improper certificate validation vulnerability exists in Pgpool-II, which may allow an unauthenticated attacker to bypass client certificate authentication. |
| In wolfSSL versions 5.7.2 through 5.9.2 there is a client-side implementation flaw in RFC 6961, multiple OCSP response stapling, which can lead to certificate forgery. When a wolfSSL client enables OCSP stapling with the HAVE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_REQUEST_V2 feature and calls wolfSSL_UseOCSPStaplingV2(ssl, WOLFSSL_CSR2_OCSP_MULTI, options), the client accepts any certificate in the peer's chain as a certificate authority without verifying that the certificate is actually authorized to act as one. This means that an attacker who possesses any certificate that chains to a CA trusted by the client (along with its private key) can forge certificates for arbitrary identities that will be accepted as valid by the client. The end entity certificate of the server is stored in the persistent trust store, affecting subsequent connections that reuse the context even when OCSP multi usage is not employed. Found by internal wolfSSL testing. |
| Contrast before 1.16.0 is susceptible to remote attestation relay attacks. Contrast accepted any TEE attestation report that verified correctly and contained the expected firmware patch levels and software measurements, regardless of which machine produced it, so attestation was not bound to specific, physically trusted hardware. An attacker who can both intercept network traffic between the CLI and the Coordinator (or between the Coordinator and an attested component) and forge reports or extract secrets from any single TEE machine under their physical control can relay such a report to impersonate a Contrast Coordinator or a Contrast workload, defeating identity verification in Contrast's attested TLS (aTLS). |
| Cato Windows SDP Client before version 6.12.6 contains an arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. A low-privileged local user can cause the Windows service, running as Local System, to read and disclose arbitrary local files due to improper file path validation and missing TLS certificate enforcement. |
