| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Use after free in Fonts in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use after free in Media in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Select in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Tint in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Streaming in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Chrome Tabs in Google Chrome on on Mac prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Modularization in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Media in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Storage in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Parser in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Bindings in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Media in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in HTML in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in ANGLE in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in PDF in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()
A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is
attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread's
posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.
When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns
that PID. pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,
but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()
takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it
has nothing to undo.
begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after
exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state
normally stays invisible. But bprm->point_of_no_return is set before
de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or
exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.
exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,
and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.
In short:
the non-leader thread B the parent
timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)
timer_settime()
arm_timer() // the node is queued on B
execve()
de_thread(B)
exchange_tids(B, leader) // B's PID now belongs to the leader
release_task(leader)
__exit_signal(leader)
posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader) // cleans leader's queue, not B's
__unhash_process(leader) // that PID has no task anymore
exec_mmap()
mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm)
kill(B, SIGKILL)
// -EINTR
get_signal()
do_exit()
exit_itimers()
posix_timer_delete()
posix_cpu_timer_del()
posix_timer_unhash_and_free() // freed while still queued
wait4()
release_task(B)
posix_cpu_timers_exit(B)
cleanup_timerqueue()
timerqueue_del() // use-after-free
Move the POSIX timer cleanup right after de_thread() before any of the
later failure conditions brings the task into do_exit().
[ tglx: Move the cleanup right after de_thread() ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp()
sk->sk_flags must only be changed while holding the socket lock,
because sock_set_flag() and sock_reset_flag() use non atomic
operations (__set_bit() and __clear_bit()).
sock_gettstamp() is one of the last places where a bit of sk->sk_flags
is changed from a syscall without owning the socket lock, through
sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP).
sk_set_memalloc() and sk_clear_memalloc() also change sk->sk_flags
without the socket lock, but their callers (nbd, iscsi_tcp, nvme-tcp,
sunrpc, wireguard) need a careful audit, this will be addressed in a
separate patch.
Jungwoo Lee and Wongi Lee reported an UDP socket use-after-free
caused by this bug: a SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW ioctl racing with bind()
can cancel the SOCK_RCU_FREE bit that udp_lib_get_port() just set,
because both threads perform a read-modify-write on the same word.
CPU 0 (bind) CPU 1 (SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW)
-------------------------------- ----------------------------
read sk_flags = F read sk_flags = F
compute F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) compute F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)
store F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE)
sk_add_node_rcu(sk, ...)
store F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)
After the lost update, SOCK_RCU_FREE is clear while the socket is
visible to lockless UDP receive lookups. sk_destruct() then frees
the socket immediately instead of waiting for a RCU grace period,
while the receive path still holds a reference-less pointer to it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x30/0x410
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888008806610 by task exploit/207
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 207 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.12.95+ #1
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x30/0x410
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x51c/0x1180
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x109/0x350
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x14b/0x310
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x29d/0x390
ip_local_deliver+0x24d/0x2a0
Only grab the socket lock when SOCK_TIMESTAMP has to be set,
to keep the common case lockless. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Reject unregistering netdevs in ib_get_eth_speed
ib_device_get_netdev() intentionally returns a referenced net_device even
when it is unregistering, so matching and cleanup callers can still find
the association. The reference keeps struct net_device allocated, but does
not guarantee that the device remains operational.
ib_get_eth_speed() uses the returned device operationally by invoking its
ethtool callback. Although that call is made under RTNL, the function does
not verify the registration state first. An asynchronous RDMA port query
can therefore call into a netdev after NETDEV_UNREGISTER and ndo_uninit
have completed.
Check for NETREG_REGISTERED while holding RTNL and return -ENODEV for a
device which is being unregistered. Keeping RTNL across the check and the
ethtool operation prevents unregister from starting between them.
Keep the speed fallback and warning under RTNL as well, so the warning can
safely read netdev->name. Drop the netdev reference before releasing RTNL
once all accesses to the device are complete. |
