| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 17.11 before 19.2.8, all 19.3 versions, and 19.4 before 19.4.2 that, under certain conditions, could have allowed an unauthenticated user to read work item contents from private groups and projects due to incorrect authorization checks. |
| An issue in SKYWORTH DIGITAL CO.,LTD SK-WR6640X Wi-Fi 6 Dual-Band Fiber Router (AX1800M) V1.0.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. |
| The Okta Credential Provider for Windows does not validate a serialized credential buffer before interpreting it as a Kerberos logon structure. The buffer size and packed string offsets are not checked. Processing a malformed buffer can cause the credential provider process to terminate unexpectedly or lead to out-of-bounds memory reads and writes, which may result in the disclosure of adjacent process memory into local system logs. |
| Redash is a package for data visualization and sharing. From 26.0.0 until 26.9.0, the DuckDB query runner's _connect() path in redash/query_runner/duckdb.py created connections with enable_external_access left at its default value of true. A user with query access to an administrator-created DuckDB data source could use native file-reading functions to retrieve files readable by the Redash process or use COPY TO to write files with that process's privileges. Reading application secrets such as REDASH_COOKIE_SECRET or REDASH_SECRET_KEY could also enable forged sessions and authentication bypass. This issue is fixed in version 26.9.0. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions < V31.01.13), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions < V1.1.4), SIMATIC IPC227G / IPC277G / IPC277G PRO / IPC327G / IPC377G (All versions < V28.01.15). A BIOS vendor test key is present in the UEFI Secure Boot key database. This could allow a local attacker with physical or administrative access to the device to boot an operating system or UEFI application signed with that test key, bypassing UEFI Secure Boot protections even when Secure Boot is enabled, potentially leading to a full loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the device. |
| Huawei's openUBMC ships a default SNMPv3 USM key that uses one value for both authentication and privacy. An attacker who holds the key (recoverable from the open-source build) can authenticate SNMPv3 to, and decrypt SNMPv3 traffic from, any unit that still carries the shipped key. The build customization `manifest/build/customization/default_password.lua` sets `AuthenticationKey == EncryptionKey == 7df2f29369e3ac3245b2c9d46b67a0ecd055197e41808a34ef325db2f6422581` for the iBMC product build, and the community seed `account/manufacture/default_password.lua` sets both to `7a2f5b86f20233ec7b7bef49643fbf34d86d0cbf6f1f8f5c52d4f30d4536938b`. These are shipped constants, not per-unit values, and they are not rotated by the Administrator password reset, so they survive account provisioning. This is especially dangerous considering that SNMP access is mapped to full device administration privileges, including system reset and firmware upgrades. |
| Affected devices do not properly sanitize comment fields contained in imported trace files before rendering them on the Trace page.
This could allow an attacker to social engineer an authorized user who holds the function right “Read diagnostics” into importing a specially crafted trace file. Successful exploitation could allow attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute in the user’s browser session and perform PLC operations through the web server within the scope of the user’s authorization. |
| Affected systems do not properly restrict access to internal APIs and paths for authenticated users. This could allow an authenticated remote attacker to access sensitive internal information, which in the worst case could be leveraged to facilitate unauthorized access to the system or result in the deletion of data. |
| Redash is a package for data visualization and sharing. From versions after 8.0.0 until 26.9.0, the Query Results query runner in redash/query_runner/query_results.py accepts param_query_N_{key=value} parameters and passed attacker-controlled values to replace_query_parameters() for raw substitution into a referenced query's SQL. This path bypassed the ParameterizedQuery schema validation used by normal query execution and omitted the is_safe permission check. An authenticated user with at least view-only access to both the Query Results data source and the referenced data source could therefore inject SQL through text parameters and execute it with the referenced data source's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 26.9.0. |
| The Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway implementation in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c keeps its struct bt_hfp_ag objects in a static pool indexed by ACL connection index. On link teardown, hfp_ag_disconnected() cancels ag->tx_work and the per-call work items and then clears ag->acl_conn, which marks the pool slot as free — but it leaves ag->ongoing_call_work (and ag->slc_work) untouched. The next connection that lands on the same slot enters hfp_ag_create(), whose only occupancy test is ag->acl_conn, and immediately executes memset(ag, 0, sizeof(struct bt_hfp_ag)) followed by k_work_init_delayable(). Zeroing and re-initialising a k_work_delayable whose struct _timeout node is still linked into the kernel timeout list leaves the kernel holding a reference to a node with NULL prev/next links.
ag->ongoing_call_work is armed by the remote peer: when a Hands-Free unit sends AT+CIND? during Service Level Connection establishment and the application provides the asynchronous get_ongoing_call callback, the AG schedules the work for CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG_GET_ONGOING_CALL_TIMEOUT milliseconds (default 10000). The timer is cancelled only if the application answers in time via bt_hfp_ag_ongoing_calls(). A peer that sends AT+CIND?, then disconnects the HFP RFCOMM DLC, then immediately re-opens it on the same ACL link, reuses the same pool slot deterministically while the timeout is still pending — the AG's RFCOMM server accept path (hfp_ag_accept()) calls hfp_ag_create() directly, so the remote side drives both teardown and re-creation.
The result is corruption of the kernel's timeout list: sys_dlist_remove() on the zeroed node performs writes through NULL pointers from the clock-announce path, and rescheduling the re-initialised work re-inserts a node the list already references, creating a cycle that the announce loop walks with interrupts locked. The observable impact is a fault or hang of the whole system, i.e. a denial of service reachable from Bluetooth radio range; no attacker-controlled data is written, so this does not by itself yield code execution. Exposure is limited to builds with CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG (marked experimental and disabled by default) whose application implements the asynchronous get_ongoing_call callback. |
| The Bluetooth host's ATT transmit path releases a buffer it does not own when signing fails. chan_send() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c documents (and every other error exit implements) the contract that on failure the caller retains ownership of the net_buf; the BT_ATT_OP_SIGNED_WRITE_CMD branch instead called net_buf_unref(buf) when bt_smp_sign() returned an error and then returned that error to the caller. The callers act on the contract: process_queue() re-queues the buffer with k_queue_prepend(), bt_att_chan_send_rsp() puts it back on chan->tx_queue, bt_att_chan_req_send() restores it into the request, and att_req_retry() unreferences it — so the already-freed buffer was re-queued, later dereferenced, and eventually freed again.
An ATT Signed Write Command is produced when an application calls bt_gatt_write_without_response_cb() with sign set on an unencrypted connection. bt_smp_sign() fails whenever no local CSRK exists for the peer (-ENOENT), and whether one exists is negotiated with the peer: smp_distribute_keys() stores a local CSRK only when the peer's pairing key-distribution field requests the signing key and bonding was agreed. A peer can therefore pair without accepting the CSRK, pair with No Bonding, remain unpaired, or keep the link unencrypted, and the victim's next signed write takes the failing path. Because struct net_buf's node field is simultaneously the linkage word for the ATT TX FIFO, for the deferred-destroy list used by the att_pool destroy callback att_tx_destroy(), and for the pool free list, the mishandled buffer corrupts these lists and can be re-issued by bt_att_create_pdu() to a new PDU while the ATT TX path still holds it.
The same branch also saved the net_buf_simple_state only after signing, so a buffer restored after a bt_l2cap_send_pdu() failure kept its 12-octet signature; a subsequent retry re-signed it and appended a second signature with net_buf_add(buf, 12) to a buffer that bt_att_create_pdu() sized for exactly one, writing past the end of the pooled buffer in builds where the net_buf tailroom assertion is compiled out.
Impact is host-side memory corruption in the Bluetooth stack: list corruption, a pooled ATT buffer with two owners (wrong PDU contents transmitted, or a double free when the queues are drained at disconnect), and a bounded out-of-bounds write on the retry path — typically observed as a crash or assertion failure. Exposure requires the deprecated CONFIG_BT_SIGNING to be enabled and an application that actually issues signed writes; in that configuration the triggering condition is under the remote peer's control. |
| The Bluetooth Mesh Access layer delayable-message machinery in subsys/bluetooth/mesh/delayable_msg.c manages a static pool of CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_COUNT message contexts (default 4) threaded onto a free_ctx or busy_ctx list. release_delayable_msg_ctx() returned a context to free_ctx only when sys_slist_find_and_remove() found it on busy_ctx. The chunk-exhaustion error path in bt_mesh_delayable_msg_manage() releases a context that was already popped off free_ctx but not yet inserted on busy_ctx, so the context was appended to neither list and was permanently lost from the pool. Because bt_mesh_delayable_msg_init() runs only once from bt_mesh_init(), and node reset/suspend only drain busy_ctx, the loss survives unprovision, re-provision and suspend/resume — it is cleared only by a reboot.
The error path is reached when the chunk pool (CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_CHUNK_COUNT, default 40 chunks) is short of the chunks a new delayed message needs and the oldest pending message cannot be flushed because bt_mesh_access_send() returns -EBUSY or -ENOBUFS (all segmented-TX contexts busy, or advertising/segment buffers exhausted). A peer that is provisioned into the mesh network — holding a valid NetKey plus an AppKey or DevKey bound to a server model — can drive both conditions by flooding the victim with requests that elicit segmented responses while withholding the Segment Acknowledgment, which keeps the transmit contexts occupied while queued responses hold the chunk pool. Each further request that arrives in that window leaks one context.
Once the pool is drained, bt_mesh_delayable_msg_manage() returns -ENOMEM for every subsequent send and bt_mesh_model_send() propagates that error with no fallback to an immediate transmit. Since CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG and CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_CTX_ENABLED are both enabled by default, ctx->rnd_delay is set for every received access message, so all replies from Configuration Server, Health Server and application server models are silently dropped. The node keeps receiving and processing traffic but never answers, a persistent denial of service until the device is restarted. There is no memory corruption, information disclosure or integrity impact; releases before the fix compute the chunk count from the transmit buffer capacity rather than its payload length, making chunk-pool starvation — and therefore the leak — considerably easier to provoke. |
| The Bluetooth Mesh Access-layer delayable message queue in subsys/bluetooth/mesh/delayable_msg.c shares three intrusive lists (busy_ctx, free_ctx, free_chunks) and one k_work_delayable between two cooperative threads with no synchronization: bt_mesh_delayable_msg_manage() runs on the Bluetooth host RX thread, while delayable_msg_handler() runs on the system workqueue. Both block while the lists are in an intermediate state — the enqueuer in bt_rand(), both in bt_mesh_access_send() — which lets the other context observe torn state. delayable_msg_handler() used the result of sys_slist_get() on busy_ctx without a NULL check, and allocate_delayable_msg_ctx() tested sys_slist_is_empty() and then assumed a separate sys_slist_get() would succeed.
Because CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG and CONFIG_BT_MESH_ACCESS_DELAYABLE_MSG_CTX_ENABLED default to y, every model response to a received mesh message is parked on this queue, so the enqueuer runs as a direct consequence of inbound traffic. A peer that can get access-layer messages accepted by a model (it must hold the NetKey and a bound AppKey, so a legitimate or compromised network member) controls the arrival rate, the size of the elicited responses and the destination address, and thereby controls occupancy of the 4-entry context pool and the 40-entry chunk pool. Exhausting the chunk pool forces bt_mesh_delayable_msg_manage() down the purge path, which sends and releases the only queued message and leaves busy_ctx empty while the delayable work item is still armed; if the enqueuer then yields, the handler runs against the empty list.
The result is a read-modify-write through a NULL-based pointer (pending_msg->fired_time += 10) at a fixed low address on the system workqueue thread. On typical targets that faults, aborting the system workqueue thread — which stops all workqueue-driven functionality, including the mesh timing machinery — or resetting the node, so the impact is loss of availability of the affected node. The write value and address are fixed and no attacker-controlled length or index is involved, so this is not exploitable for memory corruption or code execution. The same unsynchronized window also allowed one message context to be selected and released by two contexts at once, producing duplicated transmissions, duplicated send-completion callbacks and crossed chunk ownership.
The fix serializes every list mutation with a k_spinlock that is never held across a blocking call, makes push_msg_from_delayable_msgs() detach the queue head atomically so a message being sent is on no list, removes the unchecked sys_slist_get() from delayable_msg_handler(), and drops any message that reaches the front of the queue while the stack is suspended or reset. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.7 before 19.2.8, 19.3 before 19.3.5, and 19.4 before 19.4.2 that, under certain conditions, could have allowed an authenticated user with Developer role to execute CI/CD pipelines on protected branches without authorization due to improper authorization checks in the downstream pipeline creation service. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 17.0 before 19.2.8, 19.3 before 19.3.5, and 19.4 before 19.4.2 that, under certain conditions, could have allowed an authenticated user with Guest access to read confidential epic content meant to be restricted by external authorization, due to incorrect authorization checks. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.11 before 19.2.8, 19.3 before 19.3.5, and 19.4 before 19.4.2 that, under certain conditions, could have allowed an authenticated user with a project-scoped fine-grained Personal Access Token to permanently delete or modify group-level labels, due to incorrect authorization logic on label ownership scope validation. |
| Shopizer through 3.2.5 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated customers to post reviews as other customers by supplying a customerId field. Attackers can send crafted requests to POST /api/v1/auth/products/{id}/reviews to publish reviews and ratings attributed to other store customers, corrupting authorship and product ratings. |
| Colanode server through 0.4.7 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users to read arbitrary .jpeg files by supplying an encoded traversal sequence in avatarId. Attackers can send percent-encoded ../ sequences to GET /client/v1/avatars/:avatarId to escape the avatars directory and read .jpeg files belonging to other workspaces. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in cemtan sar2html 4.0.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file sar2html.py. The manipulation of the argument SECRET_KEY results in hard-coded credentials. The attack can be executed remotely. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| The Model Context Protocol Java SDK is the official Java SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. From version 0.8.0 through 0.12.0 in the io.modelcontextprotocol.sdk:mcp artifact, from 0.13.0 through 0.18.3 and 1.0.0 through 1.1.3 in io.modelcontextprotocol.sdk:mcp-core, and from mcp-core 2.0.0-M1 through 2.0.0, the Servlet-based SSE, Streamable HTTP, and Stateless server transports read an HTTP request body into memory without enforcing a maximum size. An unauthenticated remote client able to reach an affected transport can stream an arbitrarily large POST body, including with chunked transfer encoding, until the Java process exhausts its heap and becomes unavailable. Authentication, Origin or Host validation, or an upstream request-size limit can reject the request before the vulnerable read. The maintained mcp-core lines are fixed in versions 0.18.4, 1.1.4, and 2.0.1. |
