{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-65197", "assignerOrgId": "44488dab-36db-4358-99f9-bc116477f914", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "runZero", "dateReserved": "2026-07-21T20:14:38.328Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-13T14:17:54.265Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-13T14:17:54.265Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "44488dab-36db-4358-99f9-bc116477f914", "shortName": "runZero", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-13T14:17:54.265Z"}, "title": "H3C G3/G5 HDM Firmware Verification Key Replacement", "datePublic": "2026-10-13T14:00:00.000Z", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-347", "description": "CWE-347 Improper verification of cryptographic signature", "type": "CWE"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "H3C", "product": "HDM Family-A G5", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.14.01", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key.\u00a0\n\nThis was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<div><div>H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key.&nbsp;<br><br><div><div>This was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.</div></div></div></div>"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://www.runzero.com/advisories/h3c-hdm-firmware-verification-key-replacement-cve-2026-65197", "tags": ["third-party-advisory"]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}], "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseSeverity": "LOW", "baseScore": 3.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"options": [{"Exploitation": "poc"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "total"}], "role": "CNA", "version": "2.0.3"}}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "HD Moore of runZero", "type": "finder"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "Tod Beardsley of runZero", "type": "coordinator"}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"}}}}

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